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THE UNAMBIGUOUS SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence has 
reached a confusing junction. The Court recently declined to say whether 
the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action for federal court litigants. 
As a result, lower courts and litigants are caught between conflicting doc-
trines: one that suggests and one that denies that the Supremacy Clause 
confers causes of action. Neither line of cases definitively answers the ques-
tion. A cause of action is necessary for a federal court plaintiff to bring 
suit. This Note explores whether potential plaintiffs should be able to rely 
on the Supremacy Clause when applicable federal law does not otherwise 
confer a cause of action. Navigating the history of the Supremacy Clause, 
the contours of dueling lines of precedent, and policy ramifications, the 
Note concludes that, in the midst of the confusion, state defendants have a 
strong argument that the Supremacy Clause does not confer plaintiffs a 
cause of action. 
Introduction 
 The premise of federal supremacy (or preemption) is elementary.1 
When a state law conflicts with a federal law, the Supremacy Clause 
provides a resolution: federal law trumps state law.2 For nearly three 
decades, however, the alluring simplicity of Supremacy Clause conflicts 
masks what is actually a confused doctrine.3 No unequivocal answer 
exists to the question of whether the Supremacy Clause provides an 
independent cause of action.4 Rather than offering clarity, the U.S. Su-
preme Court recently injected even more uncertainty into the arena 
when it passed on an opportunity to answer the question that has long 
simmered in the background of certain preemption cases.5 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (noting that state laws con-
trary to the laws of Congress are invalid because “[i]n every such case, the act of Congress 
. . . is supreme; and the law of the State though enacted in the exercise of powers not con-
troverted, must yield to it”); Mary Ann K. Bosack, Cigarette Act Preemption—Refining the 
Analysis, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 756, 761 (1991) (“When Congress legislates in an area within its 
constitutional grant of power, the supremacy clause mandates that federal law displace 
state law.”). 
2 U.S. Const. art. VI; Bosack, supra note 1, at 761. 
3 See infra notes 90–189 and accompanying text. 
4 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2012) (ac-
knowledging that the question of whether the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action 
for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries is unanswered). 
5 See Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1211. 
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 The confusion does not arise in all preemption contexts.6 For in-
stance, a defendant asserting preemption as a defense need not rely on 
a cause of action, whether located in the Supremacy Clause or else-
where.7 A plaintiff who relies on a federal statute that creates a cause of 
action or a constitutional provision that creates a federal right (such as 
the Commerce Clause) likewise is not affected by the abstract question 
of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action.8 Instead, 
the question that remains unanswered comes up in a narrow but im-
portant class of cases in which a federal law alleged to preempt a state 
law does not contain a private cause of action.9 In those cases, plaintiffs 
swing preemption as a sword to seek prospective relief in the form of 
injunctions against state action and declaratory judgments of unconsti-
tutionality.10 
 These preemption plaintiffs arrive at the courthouse in one of two 
vehicles: they either explicitly allege federal preemption of state law,11 
or they imply federal preemption of state law.12 The different treatment 
afforded such plaintiffs in preemption cases has not only led to the 
question of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action, 
but also defined the contours of a tentative answer.13 
                                                                                                                      
 
6 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992) (asserting preemp-
tion in defense). 
7 Id.; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (asserting pre-
emption in defense to an alleged violation of a state law regarding pesticide use). 
8 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1, 199–200. The Gibbons plaintiff had no need for a statutory 
cause of action when it could rely on the Commerce Clause to assert that a state law regu-
lating navigation of state waters conflicted with the Commerce Clause and therefore vio-
lated the plaintiff’s rights under the Commerce Clause. Id. 
9 See infra notes 90–189 and accompanying text. 
10 See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (involving a suit prospec-
tively seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a pending state employment law on 
grounds that contrary federal law preempted it). In this respect, prospective preemption 
plaintiffs differ from traditional preemption plaintiffs in that traditional preemption plain-
tiffs seek to remedy an injury an allegedly preempted law or action already caused. See, e.g., 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (challenging a state tobacco ad-
vertising regulation as preempted by federal law after the state regulation limited the abil-
ity of the tobacco company to advertise). 
11 See infra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 163–174 and accompanying text. 
13 See Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1211 (directing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit Court on remand to consider several specific factors to determine if the Supremacy 
Clause conferred a cause of action in the narrow circumstance of Medicaid beneficiaries 
alleging that federal Medicaid law preempted state action). Consider Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, the 2000 Supreme Court case of a nonprofit business organization suing the 
State of Massachusetts, explicitly alleging that a federal Burmese trade law preempted a state 
law restricting business activity with Burma. 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). The justices emphati-
cally struck down the state law, remarking on the obvious federal preemption. Id. at 373–74. 
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 This Note examines that preemption doctrine and its incongruity: 
different classes of plaintiffs are burdened with different cause of ac-
tion requirements in the shadow of the Supremacy Clause.14 The evolu-
tion of constitutional law has produced various doctrines—cause of ac-
tion,15 jurisdiction,16 and standing17—to ensure that federal courts 
properly adjudicate valid “cases or controversies” pursuant to Article III 
of the Constitution.18 Notwithstanding the command of Article III, fed-
eral courts, including the Supreme Court, have permitted some types 
of preemption plaintiffs to pursue claims without demonstrating a valid 
cause of action.19 The implication for these plaintiffs who prospectively 
assert preemption is that the Supremacy Clause provides not only fed-
eral court jurisdiction but also a cause of action where one does not 
otherwise exist in the federal law alleged to preempt the conflicting 
state law or action.20 
 Jurisdiction, or the power of a federal court to hear a case, has long 
been found to exist in Supremacy Clause cases.21 In February 2012, the 
Supreme Court declined to define the extent to which the Supremacy 
Clause also provides a cause of action.22 After initially granting certiorari 
to review the specific question of whether the Supremacy Clause pro-
vided a cause of action for certain preemption plaintiffs, a 5–4 Court 
remanded the case to the lower court for further argument on the same 
question, leaving the state of the doctrine particularly uncertain.23 
 This Note argues that unless and until the Supreme Court holds 
that the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action, a distinction 
among plaintiffs in which some are and others are not found to have a 
valid cause of action is without merit.24 All preemption plaintiffs should 
                                                                                                                      
Curiously, no one—not the justices and not the state defendant—stopped to ask whether the 
nonprofit corporation had a valid cause of action. Id. 
14 See infra notes 90–270 and accompanying text. 
15 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001). 
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803). 
17 Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
18 U.S. Const. art. III; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504, U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“One 
of those landmarks, setting apart the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable 
sort referred to in Article III . . . is the doctrine of standing.”). 
19 See infra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text. 
22 Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1211. 
23 See id.; see also id. at 1214 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If, as I believe, there is no pri-
vate right of action under the Supremacy Clause . . . that is the end of the matter. If, on the 
other hand, the Court believes that there is such an action . . . then the Court should just 
say that.”). 
24 See infra notes 190–270 and accompanying text. 
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be required to establish a valid cause of action independent of the Su-
premacy Clause to satisfy the adjudicatory principles of the federal ju-
diciary.25 The current doctrine that affords varying cause of action re-
quirements for different plaintiffs harms principles of fairness,26 
infringes on the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure,27 and 
undermines federalism goals.28 
 Part I navigates the historical development of the Supremacy 
Clause, illustrating its grounding in preemption cases.29 Part II lays out 
the important roles that jurisdiction and cause of action play in federal 
court and how those roles affect preemption cases.30 Although cause of 
action and jurisdiction generally establish a plaintiff’s right to be in 
federal court and the court’s power to hear the case, only jurisdiction 
appears to be necessary for some preemption plaintiffs.31 Part II also 
introduces the reality that varying standards exist for different types of 
preemption plaintiffs, particularly with respect to the cause of action 
requirement.32 
 In Part III, the Note closely examines the cause of action burdens 
for those different types of preemption plaintiffs: those who expressly 
allege preemption and those who imply preemption.33 In this examina-
tion, Part III highlights the considerably different treatment with re-
spect to the Supremacy Clause and cause of action analysis afforded 
plaintiffs with merely subtle differences.34 In Part IV, the Note analyzes 
the impact of this varying treatment and argues for a clearer standard 
for all preemption plaintiffs, thereby staying true to historical intent, 
the separation-of-powers constitutional framework, and federalism 
principles.35 
I. Supremacy Clause Evolution 
 Modern preemption doctrine derives from Supremacy Clause ju-
risprudence, which has evolved from the nation’s founding to present 
                                                                                                                      
25 See infra notes 196–270 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 38–40, 218–242 and accompanying text. 
27 See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, III (separating power among three major branches of gov-
ernment: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary). 
28 See infra notes 257–270 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 36–63 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 90–189 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 90–189 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 190–270 and accompanying text. 
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day.36 The arc of this evolution helps explain the Court’s contemporary 
approach to federal preemption cases and ultimately helps answer the 
question of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action or 
merely ranks federal over state rights.37 
 The Supremacy Clause was adopted to resolve an embarrassing 
power struggle for the young United States.38 When the Constitutional 
Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787, they convened amidst—indeed, 
because of—a disturbing reality: the failure of the Articles of Confed-
eration to establish an effective, stable, and cohesive governing struc-
ture.39 Handcuffed by substantial state power and independence, Con-
gress struggled to raise money to repay war debts to Revolutionary 
soldiers, manage the nation’s western expansion, and engage with a 
single national voice in effective and meaningful foreign relations.40 
Indeed, uncertainty, as much as anything else, defined who was and 
who was not sovereign in the new America.41 State governments pro-
moted the public’s general distrust of government.42 The 1780s saw 
overregulation, chaotic procedures of passing and repealing laws, and 
commercially damaging ex post facto laws.43 
 Frustrated with such circumstances, the Framers restructured 
American government, including notions of separation of powers and a 
federalism that clarified the allocation of sovereign authority in the 
constitutional architecture.44 To support this structure, the Framers 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967, 
972–75 (2002) (noting the “long history” of preemption rooted in the Supremacy Clause 
and the expansion of preemption doctrine following “the unprecedented legislative activ-
ity of the post-Depression era”); see also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 
635, 642 (2002); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 
(1989); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149–50 (1908); Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 1, 211. 
37 See Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 334 (5th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the Supremacy Clause implies a private cause of action). But see An-
drews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the Supremacy Clause 
merely ranks federal statutes ahead of state laws in the event of a conflict as opposed to 
implying a cause of action). For an argument that the Supremacy Clause should imply a 
cause of action in the prospective preemption context, see David Sloss, Constitutional Reme-
dies for Statutory Violations, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 355, 364 (2004). 
38 G. Edward White, Revisiting the Ideas of the Founding, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 969, 975–76 
(2009). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 974–75. 
41 Id. at 976. 
42 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 
405–07 (1998). 
43 Id. 
44 White, supra note 38, at 978–79. 
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crafted the Supremacy Clause and created a federal Supreme Court 
empowered to enforce the clause.45 Whereas the nation had previously 
stumbled in asserting its authoritative voice, the reality of federal su-
premacy post-ratification was clear.46 When faced with conflicting state 
and federal law, the Supreme Court needed only to turn to the Su-
premacy Clause to find that federal law controls:47 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.48 
 The combination of a Supremacy Clause and a Supreme Court to 
enforce it brought federal preemption into the fabric of American ju-
risprudence.49 In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized in Gib-
bons v. Ogden that a state law contrary to a federal law must yield to its 
federal counterpart because “the framers of our constitution foresaw 
this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not 
only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it” by insertion of 
the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.50 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
49 See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (asserting ju-
risdiction over a state court decision involving a federal question and holding that a fed-
eral treaty preempted state action); White, supra note 38, at 980 (“[T]hrough the idea of 
enumerated federal powers, reserved state powers, and the Supremacy Clause, the drafters 
of the Constitution said, in effect, to state legislatures: we will offer you a model of gov-
ernment designed to function, and, by the way, if it passes laws that conflict with your laws, 
you will have to obey them.”). Additionally, the Supremacy Clause ensured a federalist 
model for the new nation because it operated in conjunction with Article I of the Constitu-
tion, which conferred power to appoint Senators on state legislatures. See Bradford R. 
Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 
1432 (2008). Small states had a guarantee, therefore, that the laws the federal government 
passed, which were supreme by definition, were made with state participation. See id. 
50 22 U.S. at 210–11. The Supremacy Clause is enforceable in state as well as federal 
courts. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
489, 507 (1954) (“The supremacy clause, of course, makes plain that if a state court under-
takes to adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance with whatever federal law is 
applicable.”). Indeed, until federal question jurisdiction was established in 1875, state 
courts handled the bulk of Supremacy Clause issues. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of The-
ory, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1567, 1588 (2008). 
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 As the nation lurched toward Civil War and then repaired in the 
aftermath, federal preemption proved to be a strong but controversial 
doctrine.51 Before the Civil War, the Court leveraged the preemptive 
force of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 to protect slaveholders 
who violated contrary state laws when they crossed state lines to recap-
ture escaped slaves.52 After the Civil War, southern states enacted laws 
that maintained the pre–Civil War status quo with regard to civil 
rights.53 So-called black codes prevented African Americans from vot-
ing, relocating, or enjoying public benefits, such as hospitals, parks, and 
schools.54 In response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
that, by way of the Supremacy Clause, outlawed the black codes.55 Rati-
fication of the Fourteenth56 and Fifteenth Amendments,57 which mir-
rored the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in their goals of racial equality, guar-
anteed African Americans voting rights and expanded the breadth of 
federal supremacy, though the scope of such rights remained limited by 
principles of federalism.58 
                                                                                                                      
 
51 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 608–10 (1842); Andrew P. Napoli-
tano, Dred Scott’s Revenge, A Legal History of Race and Freedom in America 111 
(2009). 
52 See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608–10. The plaintiff in Prigg v. Pennsylvania argued successfully 
before the Supreme Court in 1842 that his kidnapping arrest pursuant to Pennsylvania law 
was unconstitutional. Id. Prigg had entered Pennsylvania and taken Margaret Morgan, 
formerly enslaved in Maryland, back to Maryland where he sold her as a slave. Id. Under a 
Pennsylvania kidnapping statute, Prigg was arrested and indicted. Id. He emerged victori-
ous, however, because the Court held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which permitted 
his actions, preempted the Pennsylvania statute: 
[T]he act of Pennsylvania upon which this indictment is founded, is unconsti-
tutional and void. It purports to punish as a public offence against that state, 
the very act of seizing and removing a slave, by his master, which the constitu-
tion of the United States was designed to justify and uphold. 
Id. at 625–26. 
53 Cynthia A. Leiferman, Private Clubs: A Sanctuary for Discrimination?, 40 Baylor L. 
Rev. 71, 90 (1988) (“During the period following the passage of the thirteenth amend-
ment, the increasing frequency of private acts of discrimination against Negroes in situa-
tions involving property interests and contractual rights were viewed as a revival of the 
institution of slavery.”). 
54 Napolitano, supra note 51, at 111. 
55 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Leiferman, supra note 53, at 89–90 (“En-
actment of the 1866 Act was to . . . render void state discriminatory laws, especially the 
Black Codes.”). 
56 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
57 U.S. Const. amend. XV. 
58 See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593–94 (1871). For instance, in 
Blyew v. United States, the Court refused to recognize federal jurisdiction in a case involving 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. The Court held that removal of a murder case from state to 
federal court was improper even though, under Kentucky law, African-American witnesses 
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 The preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause gained full-
bodied status in the twentieth century when expansion of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause brought greater numbers of state 
laws into conflict with federal statutes, requiring the Court to establish a 
nuanced way to handle this sensitive area of federalism.59 The Court, 
broadly interpreting congressional purpose in the early twentieth cen-
tury, often found federal legislation to “occupy the field,” thus pre-
empting state laws.60 
 In the mid-twentieth century, the Court reversed its preemption 
tack when it emphasized a policy of presuming against preemption to 
protect state laws from unintentional preemption.61 In stating in 1947 
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co. that “[w]e start with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress,” the Court recognized a federalism interest in avoiding preemp-
tion unless indicated by congressional intent.62 Regularly since Rice, 
and as recently as 2009, the Court reaffirmed the presumption against 
preemption, citing the Rice language to underscore the federalism con-
cerns at issue in preemption cases when state sovereignty is vulnerable 
to federal domination by way of the Supremacy Clause.63 
                                                                                                                      
were not allowed to testify against Caucasian defendants in state court. Id. Because giving 
testimony was not a right conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court reasoned 
that removal to federal court pursuant to the Act was not proper. Id. at 595. 
59 See Davis, supra note 36, at 973–75. 
60 Id. at 974. 
61 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947); Davis, supra note 
36, at 978 (noting that the Court was becoming more cognizant of traditional state police 
powers and was requiring clearer congressional intent to find preemption). 
62 331 U.S. at 230; Davis, supra note 36, at 978; see also The Federalist No. 45, at 236–
37 ( James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting federal power shall be limited in 
scope while “powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in 
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State”). 
63 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 (“[W]e would nev-
ertheless have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption. ‘Because the states 
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress 
does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))); Davis, supra note 36, at 973–75. 
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II. A Working Relationship: Cause of Action and Jurisdiction in 
the Prospective Preemption Context 
 All preemption cases, whether preemption is asserted prospec-
tively or defensively, turn on the effect of the Supremacy Clause.64 But 
for a preemption plaintiff to persuade a court to reach the merits of the 
claim under the Supremacy Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
valid subject matter jurisdiction and a valid cause of action.65 This Part 
shows that the separate concepts of jurisdiction and cause of action 
work together to establish or deny federal court authority over a case, 
substantially influencing prospective preemption outcomes.66 The Part 
further shows that the Court’s contemporary approach in preemption 
cases has created ambiguity about the relationship between jurisdiction 
and cause of action.67 
 When a federal court analyzes jurisdiction, it examines its power— 
both constitutional and statutory—to hear a case or controversy.68 Sub-
ject to congressional constraints, federal courts only possess power to 
hear cases that fall within those bounds of Article III of the Constitu-
tion.69 
 In contrast to a jurisdictional analysis, a federal court analyzing the 
validity of a cause of action focuses not so much on its power to hear a 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (noting that in light of the 
power of the Supremacy Clause “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case”). 
65 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979) (“The concept of a ‘cause of action’ is 
employed specifically to determine who may judicially enforce the statutory rights or obli-
gations.”); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1884) (describing 
jurisdiction as the “judicial power of the United States” to issue a judgment); Sloss, supra 
note 37, at 377 (“[P]laintiff’s right to relief depends on whether he or she has a valid fed-
eral cause of action.”); Carl C. Wheaton, The Code “Cause of Action”: Its Definition, 22 Cor-
nell L.Q. 1, 14 (1936) (“By no stretch of the imagination can a cause of action exist with-
out a combination of facts and legal rights and duties.”). 
66 Passman, 442 U.S. at 239 (articulating the difference between jurisdiction and cause 
of action in detail and noting that cause of action analysis involves questioning whether an 
appropriate party is invoking the federal court’s power); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 
677, 746 n.17 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
67 See infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
68 Passman, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 
(1803). 
69 See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2; Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178. Congress may limit but not 
expand jurisdiction. Id. Since the first Judiciary Act in 1789, Congress has always afforded 
courts less jurisdictional power than the full scope of Article III permits. Richard H. 
Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 276 
(6th ed. 2009). For example, Congress has limited federal question, diversity, removal, and 
supplemental jurisdiction by statute pursuant to its Article III power. Id. 
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case as on the plaintiff’s power to assert a complaint.70 The Court ar-
ticulated the subtle but important difference between jurisdiction and 
cause of action analyses in Davis v. Passman in 1979 when it said that 
“jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power . . . 
to hear a case” while “cause of action is a question of whether a particu-
lar plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of 
law, appropriately invoke the power of the court.”71 
 So although a federal court may have proper jurisdiction to hear a 
case, if a plaintiff sues pursuant to a federal statute or constitutional 
provision that does not contain a cause of action, a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim should be granted.72 The Constitution ex-
plicitly provides causes of action in two situations: the guarantee of the 
writ of habeas corpus73 and just compensation in the event of a prop-
erty taking.74 Supreme Court precedent has further established that the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imply causes of action to plaintiffs asserting denials of such pro-
tections.75 Where individual rights are found in the Constitution, the 
Passman Court held, the Constitution implies a cause of action.76 
                                                                                                                      
 
70 Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 690–91 (noting that, when Congress does not ex-
pressly confer a private cause of action, the courts must engage in an analysis to determine 
if the private person seeking redress actually has a cause of action (or right) implied by 
statute). 
71 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the 
term “cause of action” with “claim”; courts, however, have continued to require plaintiffs to 
establish valid causes of action. Id. at 237; Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: 
Alternative Means of Court Access for Safety Net Statutes, 10 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 27, 32 (2008). 
72 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (holding that, although jurisdiction 
was proper, dismissal was required because the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief by 
merely reciting a formulaic cause of action without factual particularity). For example, in 
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that the relevant provision of 
Title IX did not contain a private cause of action. 526 U.S. 629, 637–38 (1999). The Su-
preme Court, finding a cause of action, reversed. Id.; Wheaton, supra note 65, at 14 (argu-
ing that, without a cause of action, a court should not hear a case because a cause of action 
is necessary). 
73 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1779 n.244 (1991). 
74 U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). Therefore, plaintiffs may rely on the Fifth Amendment’s Just 
Compensation Clause for a valid cause of action in the event of a taking without just com-
pensation. See id. 
75 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (“[D]ue process requires the State to 
provide the remedy it has promised. The obligation arises from the Constitution itself.”); 
Ward v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1919) (relying on a cause of action in the 
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 To demonstrate a statutory (as opposed to Constitutional) cause of 
action, a plaintiff must prove that Congress intended to create a cause 
of action by pointing to statutory “rights-creating” language.77 In Alex-
ander v. Sandoval, a 2001 case where the preemption allegation was im-
plied, the Court, sensitive to separation-of-powers principles,78 found 
no evidence that Congress intended to create a private cause of action 
to enforce the disparate-impact regulations promulgated under sec-
tion 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.79 Without a valid 
cause of action, the Court held that an individual could not sue the Di-
rector of the Alabama Department of Public Safety for administering 
drivers’ license examinations in a way that allegedly violated the regula-
tions so as to be preempted by Title VI.80 Proper jurisdiction notwith-
standing, the Court found the suit to be without merit because of lack 
of a cause of action.81 
 Both jurisdiction and cause of action must be found for a case to 
survive in federal court,82 and the extent to which a cause of action ex-
ists can help inform a court of its jurisdiction.83 In the contemporary 
                                                                                                                      
 
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that nonrefunded coercive taxes violated plaintiffs’ con-
stitutionally established due process rights). 
76 See Passman, 442 U.S. at 242. The Passman Court noted that, beginning with Marbury, 
the Court has long recognized a cause of action in constitutional rights: “[T]hose litigants 
who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same 
time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able 
to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable con-
stitutional rights.” Id. 
77 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13 
(“[T]he right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accu-
rate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.”). 
78 See 532 U.S. at 287 (noting that it would be improper for the federal judiciary to 
create a cause of action when Congress has not conferred such a right). 
79 Id. at 293 (“Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display 
an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promul-
gated under § 602.”). 
80 Id. at 278–79, 293. Alabama amended its constitution in 1990 to declare English the 
official language. Id. at 278–79. The plaintiffs in Sandoval sued after a state official enacted 
a policy to administer drivers’ license tests only in English pursuant to the state constitu-
tion. Id. 
81 Id. at 293. 
82 See Cale v. City of Covington, Va., 586 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that ju-
risdiction pursuant to § 1331 did not by itself create a proper cause of action). 
83 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that, if an affirma-
tive federal cause of action is found, then federal question jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 
is presumed, thereby enabling a federal court to expand its federal question jurisdiction by 
finding an implied cause of action in a federal statute). For instance, in Marbury, a case 
more famous for establishing judicial review, the Court in 1803 separately examined 
whether the plaintiff had a proper cause of action and whether the Court had jurisdiction 
to hear the case. See 5 U.S. at 168, 173, 177. Finding a cause of action, but not jurisdiction 
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preemption context, however, the Court has obscured the relationship 
between cause of action and jurisdiction.84 Whereas a valid cause of 
action and proper jurisdiction generally must exist,85 specific categories 
of preemption cases have prompted a question about whether the Su-
premacy Clause implies a cause of action.86 For some plaintiffs suing a 
state officer for prospective relief when preemption was expressly al-
leged or characterized, the Court has focused solely on whether it pos-
sessed jurisdiction—foregoing cause of action analysis.87 In other pre-
emption cases, when preemption was implied or expressly alleged in 
combination with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the Court has analyzed ju-
risdiction as well as cause of action, requiring both.88 This confusion 
continues unabated in light of the Court’s February 2012 decision in 
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. when it 
declined to answer the specific question about whether the Supremacy 
Clause conferred a cause of action for preemption plaintiffs alleging 
preemption of state action by a federal law that did not contain an evi-
dent private cause of action.89 
                                                                                                                      
(the power to hear the case) under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court refused to grant 
relief, despite acknowledging the plaintiff’s statutory injury. Id. at 173, 180. Indeed, 198 
years after Marbury, the Court continued to adhere to the principle that jurisdiction and 
cause of action both must exist for federal court adjudication. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; 
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 168, 173. 
84 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 358–60 (noting that jurisdiction is enough to qualify some 
prospective preemption plaintiffs for federal court adjudication, but that a valid cause of 
action is necessary for others). 
85 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. 233, 241 (1991) (“To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must do more 
than establish a colorable claim: a right of action must actually be established before in-
junctive relief is appropriate.”). 
86 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002); Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1982); Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 
1198, 1216 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2010); Local Union 
No. 12004, United Steelworkers v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 74–75 (1st Cir. 2004); see also 
Sloss, supra note 37, at 401. 
87 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
88 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–88; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 
493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989). 
89 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012). 
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III. Presentation of the Prospective Preemption Case: 
Characterization and Categorization Matters 
 A plaintiff’s preemption claim can either explicitly or implicitly 
allege preemption.90 An explicit allegation specifically asserts in the 
claim for relief that federal law preempts contrary state law or action.91 
An implicit allegation implies preemption by asserting in the claim for 
relief that state law or action violates a federal right.92 The cause of ac-
tion burden in a preemption case depends significantly on the explic-
itness of the preemption claim.93 This Part identifies the differences in 
asserting preemption implicitly versus explicitly.94 It demonstrates that 
different types of plaintiffs appear to have different cause of action re-
quirements.95 
 Section A explores the types of plaintiffs who have no cause of ac-
tion requirement, seemingly because they explicitly allege preemp-
tion.96 Demonstrating the importance of litigation strategy and charac-
terization, Section B describes litigants who are required to demonstrate 
a cause of action independent of the Supremacy Clause.97 Both litigants 
who imply preemption or who explicitly allege preemption and sue pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fall into this category.98 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 359 (dividing prospective preemption cases into “Shaw 
preemption cases” in which preemption is alleged explicitly and “Shaw violation cases” in 
which preemption is implied in an allegation that state or local action violates federal law). 
91 See id. 
92 See Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712 (noting the disparity between federal court 
plaintiffs who have to assert valid causes of action—including plaintiffs who implicitly al-
lege prospective preemption—and those explicitly alleging preemption who do not have 
to establish a cause of action independent of the Supremacy Clause); Sloss, supra note 37, 
at 359. 
93 See Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712. Compare Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002) (allowing action to go forward without verifying a 
cause of action when preemption is explicitly alleged), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001) (specifying that a cause of action must be present in a preemption 
case when preemption is implied by an allegation of state action in violation of federal 
rights). 
94 See infra notes 99–189 and accompanying text. 
95 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989) 
(mandating that plaintiffs alleging preemption and suing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
assert a valid cause of action). 
96 See infra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 161–189 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 99–174 and accompanying text. 
1022 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1009 
A. Plaintiffs Without a Cause of Action Requirement 
 From lower-court interpretation of two contemporary Supreme 
Court cases separated by nineteen years, a standard has emerged that, 
when a preemption plaintiff explicitly alleges preemption, a valid cause 
of action independent of the Supremacy Clause is unnecessary.99 The 
majority in the 2012 Supreme Court case of Douglas v. Independent Liv-
ing Center of Southern California, Inc. declined to answer whether this in-
terpretation validly satisfies federal cause of action requirements.100 
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. argued in dissent that, because the Su-
premacy Clause does not supply a cause of action, a plaintiff cannot 
maintain a preemption suit wherein the federal law in question does 
not supply a private cause of action.101 
 Nevertheless, no lower court determination that the Supremacy 
Clause confers a cause of action has ever been overturned by the Su-
preme Court, in part because the Court’s position remains unclear.102 
The contemporary approach derives from an early-twentieth-century 
case, Ex parte Young, in which the Court established in 1908 that juris-
diction properly exists when a plaintiff prospectively seeks relief from a 
state law or regulation in violation of, or preempted by, the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution.103 In relying so substantially 
on the jurisdictional approval of Ex parte Young in contemporary pre-
emption suits without probing for a cause of action, the Court laid the 
foundation that leads to the question of whether the Supremacy Clause 
implies a cause of action in explicit, prospective preemption suits.104 
 In 1983 in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, the Court confronted a federal-
ism question illuminated by preemption: when must a state regulation 
yield to a federal law?105 The Court found Ex parte Young–style jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
99 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1982). 
100 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012). 
101 Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
102 Compare Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1211 (declining to answer whether the Suprem-
acy Clause implicates a cause of action), with Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43 (allowing a pre-
emption action absent a cause of action without questioning whether the Supremacy 
Clause confers the cause of action). 
103 See 209 U.S. 123, 149–50 (1908); Sloss, supra note 37, at 378–79 (noting that con-
temporary prospective preemption doctrine is a logical expansion of the jurisdictional 
principle articulated in Ex parte Young). 
104 See Bobroff, supra note 71, at 71 (demonstrating that circuit courts have read an 
implied cause of action into the Supremacy Clause based on the Court’s prospective pre-
emption doctrine); Sloss, supra note 37, at 380 n.139 (“Whether plaintiffs have a private 
cause of action to bring such claims is a separate question.”). 
105 See 463 U.S. at 95 (analyzing whether a preemption question required an in-depth 
examination of congressional intent in enacting the federal legislation). 
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tion proper when plaintiffs alleged that state legislation violated—or 
was preempted by—a federal statute as opposed to a Constitutional 
provision; in so doing, the Court expanded the Ex parte Young approach 
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment.106 Citing Ex parte Young in a foot-
note, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction and left the issue of 
whether plaintiffs presented a valid cause of action unaddressed.107 
 In Shaw, the New York State Human Rights Law, interpreted by the 
New York Court of Appeals, required employers to pay certain benefits 
to workers prevented from working because of non-occupational inju-
ries or illness.108 Pregnant women fell within the qualified category, and 
employers were required to provide eight weeks of benefits to pregnant 
women for pregnancy-related disabilities.109 Several large employers 
independently sued the New York Commissioner of the Division of 
Human Rights in United States District Court, seeking injunctive relief 
by alleging that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the New York Human Rights Law.110 ER-
ISA covered the medical plans that the employers provided employees, 
and one section explicitly preempted “any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered 
by ERISA.111 The U.S. district courts in each case found the pregnancy 
benefits provision of the Human Rights Law to be preempted.112 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court affirmed.113 When 
the consolidated cases came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
referenced Ex parte Young in a powerful footnote asserting that federal 
question jurisdiction was unquestionably appropriate in a case where 
federal rights were concerned: 
 It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over 
suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal 
rights. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regula-
tion, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a 
federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question 
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. at 96 n.14. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 88–89. 
109 Id. at 89. 
110 Id. at 92–93. 
111 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91–92. 
112 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92–93. 
113 Id. at 93–94. 
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which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 to resolve.114 
 By leaning so heavily on Ex parte Young for jurisdictional support, 
the Shaw Court took the jurisdictional holding of Ex parte Young and 
expanded it to cover not only suits against state officers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment but also suits based on a federal statute.115 
Significantly, the language of the Shaw Court was clear: it was relying on 
Ex parte Young for jurisdictional support.116 The Court left unanswered, 
indeed unaddressed, the question of whether plaintiffs had a proper 
cause of action.117 Although the allegation of preemption under the 
Supremacy Clause provided support for jurisdiction, the plaintiffs were 
not required to show that Congress, through ERISA, had created a 
cause of action.118 
 Without directly holding, the Court implied that establishing a 
valid cause of action was not necessary in the preemption setting where 
the plaintiff seeking prospective relief explicitly alleged that a federal 
law such as ERISA preempted a state law or regulation such as the New 
York Human Rights Law.119 After Shaw this view became so entrenched 
that, by the time the Court decided Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council in 2000, neither the Court nor the defendant State even raised 
the cause of action issue.120 The jurisdictional thrust of Shaw in pro-
                                                                                                                      
114 Id. at 96 n.14. 
115 See id. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. The source of the Shaw plaintiffs’ cause of action is 
unclear. See id.; Sloss, supra note 37, at 378, 390 (noting that the Court did not find an 
explicit cause of action in ERISA or hold that the Supremacy Clause conferred a cause of 
action). In Sandoval, ERISA was found to include a private cause of action. 532 U.S. at 286–
88; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006). But that precedent was inapplicable to the Shaw plain-
tiffs who were not participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries of benefit plans. See Shaw, 463 
U.S. at 92; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (authorizing suit by participants, beneficiaries, and 
fiduciaries of benefit plans to enjoin conduct that violates ERISA). 
119 See Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 807 (“[T]he rule [after Shaw and Verizon] that 
there is an implied right of action to enjoin state or local regulation that is preempted by a 
federal statutory or constitutional provision–-and that such an action falls within the fed-
eral question jurisdiction–-is well established.”). Compare Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43 (fore-
going a cause of action analysis in a prospective preemption case in which preemption was 
alleged explicitly), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–88 (requiring a valid cause of action in a 
prospective preemption case in which preemption was implied in an alleged constitutional 
violation). 
120 See generally 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (neglecting to address whether a cause of action 
existed); Brief for Petitioners, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (No. 99-
474) (neglecting to argue that plaintiffs’ suit lacked a valid cause of action in federal law). 
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spective preemption cases was so overwhelming that the state neglected 
to argue that the federal law on which the plaintiff trade organization 
relied did not contain a valid cause of action.121 
 After Shaw, it became common for lower courts in preemption 
cases involving state agency action to question whether the Supremacy 
Clause conferred a cause of action because of the Shaw footnote’s posi-
tive implication.122 The answers of the lower courts varied by circuit.123 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit turned to Shaw for 
jurisdictional support in Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. 
Pegues in 1990 in which the plaintiff environmental foundation sought 
to enjoin a state action on grounds that the federal Clean Water Act 
preempted it.124 The court, however, affirmed dismissal of the case, 
holding that the Supremacy Clause does not confer a cause of action 
and that Shaw’s footnote did not suggest otherwise.125 Three days prior 
to the Legal Environmental Assistance decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held in First National Bank of Eastern Arkansas v. 
Taylor that, after Shaw, “a party may apply directly to federal court based 
on an affirmative claim of preemption,” thereby implying a cause of 
action within the Supremacy Clause.126 
                                                                                                                      
121 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 120; Monaghan, supra note 85, at 238 (noting that 
after Shaw, the appearance of a “district court’s jurisdiction to award equitable and de-
claratory relief to any preemption plaintiff” seemed clear); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, U.S. Supreme Court Media: Oyez (Mar. 22, 2000), http://www.oyez.org/cases/ 
1990-1999/1999/1999_99_474. 
122 See Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331–32 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (analyzing Shaw and its progeny and concluding that the Supremacy Clause 
provides a cause of action for a preemption claim); Local Union No. 12004, United Steel-
workers v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 74–75 (1st Cir. 2004) (questioning whether the Su-
premacy Clause confers a cause of action by comparing Shaw to previous cause of action 
precedent); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643–44 (11th Cir. 
1990) (examining whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action); Bobroff, su-
pra note 71, at 30 (“Other courts . . . read into Supreme Court jurisprudence an implied 
cause of action derived from the Supremacy Clause.”). 
123 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75; Legal 
Envtl. Assistance, 904 F.2d at 643–44. 
124 904 F.2d at 643–44. 
125 Id. (holding that Shaw’s Supremacy Clause analysis was limited to jurisdiction and 
did not eliminate a cause of action analysis). 
126 First Nat’l Bank of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 776 n.3, 777 (8th Cir. 1990). The 
Taylor decision dovetailed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Gates when it used Shaw as a foundation to explicitly hold 
that “the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against 
state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.” See Guaranty 
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 511–12 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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 The Supreme Court never directly endorsed either circuit court’s 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause’s ability to imply a cause of ac-
tion.127 Eventually, the Court took a strong step toward implying that, if 
a plaintiff clearly established jurisdiction to hear an explicitly alleged 
preemption case against a state official, then any related cause of action 
concerns would be resolved in the jurisdictional holding.128 In 2002, in 
Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission, the Court borrowed 
heavily from Shaw to imply a cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause in explicit allegation preemption cases.129 The Court declared 
that federal courts had federal question jurisdiction in the case in 
which Verizon sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a state 
agency order, alleging preemption by federal telecommunication 
law.130 The Court cast as irrelevant the state agency’s argument that the 
federal law did not provide a cause of action by noting that the absence 
of a cause of action does not reduce the judiciary’s jurisdictional power 
to adjudicate.131 Because the federal court had federal question juris-
diction to adjudicate the preemption claim, under Shaw, it need not 
worry about a missing cause of action.132 
 Although the Supreme Court did not directly hold that the Su-
premacy Clause implies a cause of action in preemptive challenges to 
state legislative action, lower federal courts have not been shy to take 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43. Although asserting that an absent cause of action did 
not preclude federal question jurisdiction in a prospective preemption case, the Court 
stopped well-short of endorsing a theory that the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of 
action for such cases. See id. 
128 See id. Upon establishing that it had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 
§ 1331, the Court addressed cause of action, stating that “[i]t is firmly established in our 
cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not impli-
cate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudi-
cate the case.” Id. 
129 See id. Verizon is included in the explicit allegation of preemption category because 
the Court explicitly characterized the dispute as one of “preemption.” See id. Arguably, the 
case could fall into the implicit allegation of preemption category because Verizon’s alle-
gation was that the state agency order violated federal law. See id. at 640, 642. 
130 Id. at 642 (“We have no doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 to 
entertain such a suit.”). After Verizon’s claim alleged that the state agency order violated 
federal law, the Court characterized the state order as explicitly preempted by federal law. 
Id. In 2000, the Court held a Massachusetts foreign trade law preempted by federal foreign 
trade law. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. In so doing, the Court progressed quickly to the merits, 
neither pausing to consider whether jurisdiction existed nor whether the federal law cre-
ated a cause of action. Id. Shaw and its jurisdictional holding played no express role in the 
Court’s decision to enjoin the state law. See id. 
131 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43. 
132 Id. 
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that step in the shadow of Shaw and Verizon.133 By 2005, lower federal 
courts confidently relied on the Shaw-Verizon doctrine to maintain juris-
diction without concern that a cause of action may be absent.134 That 
year, in Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas v. Sanchez, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asserted that no explicit 
cause of action was necessary under the Shaw-Verizon doctrine as long as 
a plaintiff sought to prospectively enjoin a state law by claiming that a 
federal statute or constitutional provision preempted it.135 The Fifth 
Circuit plainly declared that it need not be concerned that the federal 
law created no individual rights—a preemption allegation under the 
Supremacy Clause implied a cause of action.136 
 The Supremacy Clause’s implied cause of action in explicit allega-
tions of preemption has reverberated through other circuits, though 
not entirely without debate.137 In January 2011 in Wilderness Society v. 
Kane County, Utah, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit vacated a panel decision in a preemption case in which the panel 
had found that the Supremacy Clause conferred a cause of action.138 
Although the Tenth Circuit anchored its reasoning on standing 
grounds, it acknowledged the confusion over whether the Supremacy 
Clause conferred a cause of action, noting that the Supreme Court had 
not yet provided a clear answer.139 Holding that prudential standing 
doctrine required dismissal, the Tenth Circuit “assume[d] without de-
ciding that the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action whether 
one exists or not.”140 
 The Supreme Court appeared poised to resolve the debate when it 
granted certiorari in Independent Living in October 2011, specifically to 
answer the question of whether plaintiff beneficiaries could maintain a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a Medicaid 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 
2008), vacated sub nom. Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. 1204; Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, N.M., 
380 F.3d 1258, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2004); Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
134 Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
135 403 F.3d at 334–35 (“We have little difficulty in holding that Appellees have an im-
plied right of action to assert a preemption claim seeking injunctive and declaratory re-
lief.”). 
136 Id. at 335. 
137 See Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 1198, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). 
138 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011). 
139 See id. at 1169 (“The Court has yet to weigh in, however, on whether the Supremacy 
Clause provides a cause of action.”). 
140 See id. 
1028 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1009 
provision by alleging that it preempted a state law.141 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Shaw and Verizon to hold that a 
party may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a state law is 
preempted by federal law despite an absent cause of action in the fed-
eral law.142 
 The Court’s February 2012 decision, however, left the question 
unanswered and the debate unresolved.143 Rather than directly answer 
the Supremacy Clause cause of action question, the Court noted that, 
since the filing of suit, the federal agency in charge of Medicaid en-
forcement declared that the state law did not conflict with the federal 
statute and therefore the state law was not preempted.144 Although the 
Court acknowledged that a “case or controversy” remained because 
plaintiffs still challenged preemption, the Court vacated the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s allowance of the suit under the Supremacy Clause and remanded 
for further argument on whether, in light of the new posture, the Su-
premacy Clause could confer a cause of action.145 
 In sum, the Court did not reject the conclusion of circuits that 
held that the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action; it merely 
held that the changing nature of the case required re-argument at the 
circuit court level.146 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts wondered why 
remand was necessary when the basic question remained the same: 
does or does not the Supremacy Clause enable plaintiffs to sue under 
the Medicaid Act without a private cause of action?147 The dissent re-
sponded in the negative.148 In doing so, it distinguished Independent Liv-
ing from Ex parte Young.149 Chief Justice Roberts noted that—unlike the 
Ex parte Young plaintiffs who could have relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment to defend against threatened state action—the Independent 
Living plaintiffs had no other enforceable federal right.150 
                                                                                                                      
141 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 652–53 (9th Cir. 
2009), vacated sub nom. Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. 1204. 
142 Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1058–59. The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the case 
came before the Ninth Circuit a second time; the defendant director had appealed the 
district court’s decision following remand of the initial Ninth Court decision. Maxwell-Jolly 
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 992, 992 (2011). 
143 Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1211. 
144 Id. at 1209. 
145 Id. at 1209, 1211. 
146 Id. at 1211 (vacating and remanding to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration of 
whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action). 
147 Id. at 1212 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
148 Id. 
149 Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
150 Id. 
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 Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion remains just that—a non-
binding dissenting opinion.151 So it holds true that, since 1983 and 
more frequently in the past several years, the surest route into federal 
court on a prospective preemption claim has been to make the allega-
tion explicit.152 Jurisdiction is likely assured.153 Whether a cause of ac-
tion exists and its origin is considerably less relevant until a majority of 
the Supreme Court holds otherwise.154 Therefore, lack of a cause of 
action is less of a potential barrier to plaintiffs explicitly alleging pre-
emption.155 Accordingly, arguments have diminished vigor when de-
fendant states or localities attempt to assert that such plaintiffs have no 
valid cause of action.156 
 Nevertheless, Independent Living provided state agency defendants 
a potential opening.157 At least four justices directly indicated that they 
do not believe that the Supremacy Clause confers an independent 
cause of action.158 The five majority justices simply decided not to de-
cide whether it does or does not.159 The potential to make the argu-
ment and convince at least one of those justices remains in play.160 
B. Litigants Who Must Show a Cause of Action 
 The Court has been more inclined to require a plaintiff to assert a 
valid cause of action, independent of the Supremacy Clause, to main-
                                                                                                                      
151 Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 
307, 309–10 (1988) (noting that dissenting opinions by definition do not command a con-
trolling majority of the Court but can nevertheless persuade future legal change). 
152 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371–72 (discussing the procedural 
posture and the certiorari grant in Crosby that focused entirely on the preemption issue 
without any reference to cause of action analysis); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14; Sloss, supra 
note 37, at 391 (arguing that the Supreme Court has “tacitly assumed” the existence of a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause when prospective preemption is alleged ex-
plicitly). 
153 Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712, 806. 
154 See id. at 712, 806; Monaghan, supra note 85, at 238. 
155 See Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712, 806; Bobroff, supra note 71, at 45; Sloss, su-
pra note 37, at 391, 440; Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Pre-
emption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipients Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. 
L. Rev. 1583, 1602 (2010) (“[The Court] has repeatedly assumed that the Supremacy 
Clause creates an implied cause of action for plaintiffs alleging that a state law is pre-
empted by a conflicting federal law.”). 
156 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712, 806; Bobroff, 
supra note 71, at 45; Sloss, supra note 37, at 391, 440. 
157 See 132 S. Ct. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1211 (majority opinion). 
160 See id. 
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tain a suit in which preemption is implied in the allegation that state 
action violates federal rights, whether statutory or constitutional.161 
The cause of action requirement also applies to plaintiffs who sue pur-
suant to § 1983, even if the preemption allegation is explicit.162 
1. Implied Allegations 
 The reasoning behind the distinct treatment of plaintiffs making 
explicit versus implicit preemption allegations is murky.163 What is 
clear, though, is that, when the preemption allegation is implicit, the 
Court does not follow its express allegation path of heavily emphasizing 
jurisdictional power while foregoing cause of action analysis.164 In ad-
judicating implicit cases, rather, the Court has tended to follow the 
Sandoval v. Alexander proof-of-Congressional-intent approach in search-
ing for a cause of action in addition to establishing jurisdiction.165 
 Even before Sandoval, the Court acknowledged discomfort in 
permitting preemption suits against state executive action when plain-
tiffs were unable to establish any cause of action independent of the 
Supremacy Clause.166 In 1981, two years before it decided Shaw, the 
Court declared that two federal laws did not provide a proper cause of 
action for a plaintiff fisherman who alleged that actions by state and 
local officials violated federal environmental protection laws.167 The 
fisherman in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority et al. v. National Sea 
Clammers’ Ass’n implied preemption by alleging that the state action 
violated federal law.168 With the Constitution’s separation-of-powers 
construct in mind, the Court held that Congress did not intend to cre-
ate a private cause of action and therefore, despite the underlying pre-
                                                                                                                      
161 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288; Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clam-
mers’ Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Sloss, supra note 37, at 371 (referring to such cases as 
“Shaw violation” cases). 
162 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108. 
163 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72. 
164 Compare Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43 (no cause of action requirement when explicit 
preemption characterization), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–88 (cause of action required 
when implicit preemption characterization), and Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72 (“[A] judi-
cial doctrine in which the availability of an implied private right of action turns on empty 
linguistic distinctions is indefensible.”). 
165 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–88; Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17–18; California v. Sierra 
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293–94 (1981). 
166 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17–18; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293–94. 
167 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17–18. 
168 Id. 
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emption the Supremacy Clause implied, the plaintiff’s case could not 
survive.169 
 The federal court practice of searching for a cause of action in 
Congress’s intent remains good law.170 In 2001, the Court in Sandoval, a 
suit to enjoin state action that allegedly violates federal law, held that a 
plaintiff must prove that Congress intended to create a cause of action 
in the federal law.171 The holding in Sandoval did not address the Su-
premacy Clause’s capacity to confer a cause of action, and the Court 
did not explicitly characterize the case as a preemption challenge.172 
But when the Court held that the plaintiff in Sandoval could not enjoin 
the state regulation because there was no proof of Congress’s intent to 
create a cause of action, the Court necessarily implied that the Su-
premacy Clause could not have conferred a valid cause of action to 
support such a preemption challenge against the state executive 
agency’s actions.173 The holding reflected the Court’s cause of action 
analysis when confronted with a third type of preemption plaintiffs: 
those suing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.174 
2. Explicit Allegations in § 1983 Suits 
 Federal law permits plaintiffs to sue state officials to protect or 
vindicate constitutionally or statutorily protected rights.175 The provi-
                                                                                                                      
 
169 Id. at 18 (“Where, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are 
not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.”). 
That same year, the Court decided California v. Sierra Club, holding that the relevant fed-
eral law did not create a private cause of action for plaintiff environmentalists to enjoin 
state water agencies from allegedly violating federal water law. 451 U.S. at 293–94. Notwith-
standing the preemption implication in the allegation that state action violated federal law, 
the Court probed for a valid cause of action. Id. When it failed to find one, it dismissed the 
case, again mindful of the separation-of-powers boundaries that prevent a federal court 
from creating a cause of action when Congress has not. Id. 
170 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89. 
171 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–88. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 Compare Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 (finding that a cause of action is required when 
the preemption allegation is implicit), with Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108 (finding that a 
cause of action is required in a prospective preemption suit brought to vindicate federal 
rights under § 1983). 
175 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
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sion, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is applicable in the preemption setting when a 
plaintiff alleges that local action infringes on the plaintiff’s federal 
rights.176 The Court’s adjudication of preemption in a § 1983 context 
varies significantly with regard to cause of action analysis from non-
§ 1983 claims that explicitly allege prospective preemption.177 
 Since 1989, the Court has unambiguously permitted plaintiffs to 
rely on § 1983 to sue for prospective relief against local officials whose 
conduct is allegedly preempted by federal law.178 The Court requires, 
however, that, when a plaintiff in a preemption suit relies on § 1983 to 
prospectively vindicate federal rights, the plaintiff must identify a valid 
cause of action within the federal statute or constitutional provision 
that gives rise to the federal right.179 The requirement to point to a 
valid cause of action places such suits squarely in the Sandoval line of 
cases implicitly alleging preemption as opposed to the Shaw-Verizon line 
of cases wherein the Court did not require a valid cause of action when 
the preemption allegation or characterization was explicit.180 
 In practice, § 1983 preemption cases follow standard cause of ac-
tion analysis.181 The Court most emphatically endorsed this approach 
                                                                                                                      
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. 
176 See, e.g., Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108. State agencies may be sued prospectively, but 
not retrospectively, under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 
(1989). 
177 Compare Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108 (requiring a plaintiff to assert a valid cause of 
action independent of § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause in an explicit prospective pre-
emption case), with Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14 (foregoing a cause of action analysis in an 
explicit prospective preemption case not pursuant to § 1983). 
178 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 807–08 (noting 
that, in Golden State, the Court held that § 1983 “ordinarily embraces actions by a federal 
rightholder contending that state or local regulation is preempted by federal law”). 
179 Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; see Monaghan, supra note 85, at 242 (“The Court recog-
nizes that while section 1983 ‘must be broadly construed,’ the preemption plaintiff nonethe-
less ‘must assert the violation of a federal right.’” (quoting Golden State, 493 U.S. at 105–06)). 
180 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108. The Golden State Court thoroughly considered 
whether the federal statute at issue, the National Labor Relations Act, contained a private 
right pursuant to which the plaintiff taxi company management could sue. Id at 108–13; see 
Sloss, supra note 37, at 411 (“[E]ven assuming that a plaintiff has a meritorious argument 
for preemption of state law by federal law, that plaintiff might still lose a Shaw preemption 
claim brought under § 1983 on the grounds that the preemptive federal statute does not 
create a federal right.”). 
181 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (“[A] plaintiff must assert the 
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”); Golden State, 493 U.S. at 
108–13. 
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in Golden State Transit v. City of Los Angeles in 1989.182 Relying on a 
§ 1983 deprivation of rights argument, a plaintiff taxicab franchise 
sought injunctive and compensatory relief against the City of Los Ange-
les, alleging that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)183 pre-
empted the city’s interference with the plaintiff’s labor dispute.184 Al-
though the Court held that the § 1983 action vindicated employer 
rights under the NLRA, Justice John Paul Stevens’s decision clarified 
that the Court was looking to the NLRA and not the Supremacy Clause 
for the source of the rights or cause of action: “Respondent argues that 
the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights enforce-
able under § 1983. We agree. ‘That clause is not a source of any federal 
rights’; it ‘secures federal rights by according them priority whenever 
they come in conflict with state law.’”185 The Golden State court did not 
address Shaw at all, either in a cause of action or jurisdictional analy-
sis.186 
 What was left after Shaw, Verizon, Sandoval, and Golden State was a 
definite categorization of preemption plaintiffs, however arbitrary the 
contours of the boundaries of that categorization.187 Preemption claims 
implicitly alleged or which relied on § 1983 required a valid cause of 
action separate from the Supremacy Clause;188 general preemption 
claims excepting § 1983 claims did not require a plaintiff to assert a 
cause of action because the Supremacy Clause implied one.189 
                                                                                                                      
182 See 493 U.S. at 108. 
183 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
184 Golden State, 493 U.S. at 104–05. 
185 Id. at 107 (quoting Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979)). 
186 See id. at 107–13. 
187 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 
104–05; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
188 Golden State, 493 U.S. at 107–13. 
189 The Court’s Shaw-Verizon and Golden State preemption doctrines collided in bizarre 
fashion in a Tenth Circuit decision in 2004, which demonstrated the two doctrines’ sub-
stantial incongruity. Qwest Corp., 380 F.3d at 1264–65. In Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, New 
Mexico the Tenth Circuit applied Shaw-Verizon to a general preemption claim, but applied 
Golden State to the part of the preemption claim for attorneys’ fees that relied on § 1983. 
Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to use § 1983 claim to win attorneys’ fees. Id. 
at 1265. In the § 1983 analysis, the court examined whether the federal law at issue con-
tained rights-creating language; the court found that it did not, which lead to the conclu-
sion that the Supremacy Clause alone could not support a § 1983 claim. Id. Relying on 
Shaw and Verizon, the court asserted jurisdiction over the action, which sought to enjoin a 
local regulation on the grounds that federal telecommunication law preempted it. Id. The 
court did so even though the federal law contained no cause of action; instead, a cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause was implied. Id. 
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IV. A Historically, Politically Correct Solution: 
The Supremacy Clause Should Not Confer 
a Cause of Action 
 The Court’s prospective preemption jurisprudence creates unde-
sirable uncertainty and inconsistent results by failing to provide explicit 
guidance as to whether the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of ac-
tion.190 
 This Part argues that the Supremacy Clause does not imply a cause 
of action and that preemption plaintiffs should be required to identify 
a valid cause of action outside of the Supremacy Clause even when 
making explicit allegations of preemption.191 Section A demonstrates 
why the different types of preemption plaintiffs—§ 1983 plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs implicitly alleging preemption of state action, and plaintiffs 
explicitly alleging preemption—should be treated the same with regard 
to cause of action analysis.192 Section B illustrates why finding an im-
plicit valid cause of action in the Supremacy Clause in preemption 
cases misreads the history of the Supremacy Clause and the cause of 
action requirement.193 Section C underscores how finding an implied 
cause of action in the Supremacy Clause violates the constitutional 
separation-of-powers principle.194 In closing, Section D argues that fed-
eralism concerns should encourage the Court to require the Sandoval 
cause of action test in preemption cases.195 
A. Similarly Situated Plaintiffs Should Be Treated Alike 
 The content of a pleading or a court’s characterization of an ac-
tion should not increase or decrease the cause of action burden for a 
preemption plaintiff.196 Likewise, defendant states’ or localities’ de-
                                                                                                                      
190 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012); Wil-
derness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not clarified whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action 
in the prospective preemption context); Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers v. 
Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that an implied cause of action in 
the Supremacy Clause does not conform to Supreme Court precedent that predates Shaw 
and Verizon). 
191 See infra notes 196–270 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra notes 196–217 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 218–242 and accompanying text. 
194 See infra notes 243–256 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 257–270 and accompanying text. 
196 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72 (“[A] judicial doctrine in which the availability of 
an implied right of action turns on empty linguistic distinctions is indefensible.”). 
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fenses should not depend on the type of preemption plaintiff.197 Pre-
emption plaintiffs can generally be described as plaintiffs who: (1) ex-
plicitly allege preemption (“Shaw plaintiffs”),198 (2) implicitly allege 
preemption (“Sandoval plaintiffs”),199 or (3) rely on § 1983 to assert 
that federal law preempts local action that infringes on their federal 
rights (“§ 1983 plaintiffs”).200 In many cases, the art of pleading or the 
court’s characterization of an action could move a plaintiff from one 
category to another category.201 The distribution of justice is inequita-
ble when such similarly situated parties—those whose basic case rests 
on the alleged federal preemption of state or local action—receive such 
varied treatment.202 
 When Shaw plaintiffs use the word preemption, they send a signal 
to the court that the case not only arises under federal law but that the 
Supremacy Clause controls its resolution.203 The signal is powerful be-
cause, in one step, it establishes jurisdiction and introduces the merits 
question of whether the relevant federal law preempts the state law.204 
Cast in that frame, federal courts seem to reach the merits of such cases 
appropriately; after all, the federal judiciary exists in part to protect the 
vitality of the Supremacy Clause.205 
 That frame, however, is not viable because it enables plaintiffs 
seeking prospective relief from state action to successfully allege pre-
emption by relying on a federal law that was never meant to protect 
such plaintiffs.206 Indeed, if that were the law, then every federal law 
                                                                                                                      
197 See Fallon et al., supra note 69, at 712; Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72. 
198 See supra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 161–174 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 175–189 and accompanying text. 
201 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002). By complain-
ing that the state commission’s decision violated federal law, Verizon plaintiffs could have 
been characterized as Sandoval plaintiffs. See id. at 640; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275, 288–89 (2001). The Verizon Court, however, explicitly cast the suit in preemption 
terms. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642. 
202 See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 239; Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72. 
203 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43 (“Verizon seeks relief from the Commission’s order 
‘on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute, which by virtue of 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail,’ and its claim thus presents a fed-
eral question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to re-
solve.”); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). 
204 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
205 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; White, supra note 38, at 979. 
206 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89. The Sandoval Court explicitly noted that Congress 
did not envision the particular plaintiffs as the targets of the federal law provision that 
formed the basis of their suit. Id.; Monaghan, supra note 85, at 239–40 (“Shaw seems 
wrong, if read to permit any federal immunity holder automatic access to federal courts 
for declaratory and injunctive relief.”). 
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could be said to contain a cause of action by way of the Supremacy 
Clause in a preemption case.207 By not requiring Shaw plaintiffs to es-
tablish a separate cause of action, the Court enables Shaw plaintiffs to 
manipulate congressional legislation beyond its intended purpose.208 
The Court has resisted such manipulation in cases involving § 1983 
plaintiffs and Sandoval plaintiffs.209 Comparatively, there is nothing ex-
traordinary about Shaw plaintiffs or their cases that should obviate the 
need for cause of action analysis.210 
 Between § 1983 preemption plaintiffs and Shaw plaintiffs, the pre-
emptive nature of their claims are virtually identical, clearly stated 
through the use of “preemption” in the pleadings.211 The only signifi-
cant difference is that the invocation of § 1983 signals to a court that it 
must engage in a cause of action analysis because of the § 1983 doctrine 
that requires an independent cause of action analysis.212 Federal courts 
are keenly aware that § 1983 itself does not supply a cause of action.213 
But if the Supremacy Clause also cannot supply a cause of action for 
§ 1983 plaintiffs who explicitly allege preemption, then it should not 
supply a cause of action for Shaw plaintiffs who also allege preemption, 
but who simply do not sue under § 1983.214 The Court’s adamant re-
fusal to imply a cause of action into the Supremacy Clause for § 1983 
plaintiffs215 and Sandoval plaintiffs216 becomes frustrating silence when 
                                                                                                                      
207 See Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 1198, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). 
208 Compare Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43 (finding that plaintiffs were not required to 
demonstrate that Congress intended for a private cause of action in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89 (finding a cause of action to be absent 
from the relevant federal regulation). 
209 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89; 
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989). 
210 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. But see Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (“The interest the 
plaintiff asserts must not be ‘too vague and amorphous’ to be ‘beyond the competence of 
the judiciary to enforce.’ We have also asked whether the provision in question was ‘in-
tended to benefit’ the putative plaintiff.” (citations omitted) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke 
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430–32 (1987))). 
211 Compare Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642 (“Verizon seeks relief from the Commission’s order 
on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute . . . .”), with Golden 
State, 493 U.S. at 105 (alleging that the “city’s conduct was preempted by the National La-
bor Relations Act”). 
212 Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (engaging in a thorough cause of action analysis be-
cause of a § 1983 claim); see Monaghan, supra note 85, at 248 (“Golden State’s search for an 
underlying ‘federal right’ draws not only on section 1983’s explicit language but on cur-
rents deeply embedded in our legal and political culture.”). 
213 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283–84. 
214 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 371–72. 
215 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108. 
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Shaw plaintiffs are before the Court and are not even questioned on 
whether they can demonstrate a valid cause of action.217 
B. Correcting a Historical Misreading of the Supremacy Clause 
 Several lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s han-
dling of Shaw preemption cases as affirming that the Supremacy Clause 
implies a cause of action.218 Although doing so increases the likelihood 
that federal courts will strike down state laws that impermissibly conflict 
with federal laws, the practice misreads the history and purpose of the 
Supremacy Clause.219 
 The Framers inserted the Supremacy Clause into the Constitution 
to give explicit voice to the idea of federalism—that the nation would be 
comprised of sovereign states free to make their own laws, except that if 
those laws conflicted with federal law then federal law would control.220 
The Supremacy Clause constitutionalized federal supremacy.221 
 The Framers did not intend, however, for the Supremacy Clause to 
be a right unto itself.222 Unlike, for instance, the constitutional right to 
habeas corpus, the Supremacy Clause does not give citizens a right to 
federalism.223 It is distinct from some amendments in the Bill of Rights 
in that it does not create a right like freedom of speech224 and freedom 
from illegal search and seizure,225 or a right to a jury trial in a criminal 
                                                                                                                      
216 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89. 
217 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
218 See Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1216; Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. 
Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 2005); Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
219 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108 (holding that the Supremacy Clause is not a source 
of federal rights but that it merely “secures federal rights by according them priority 
whenever they come in conflict with state law”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
539, 609–10 (1842); Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
the Supremacy Clause ranks federal statutes ahead of state laws in the event of a conflict); 
White, supra note 38, at 978–79. 
220 White, supra note 38, at 978–79. 
221 See id. 
222 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; Andrews, 525 F.2d at 118–19; Clark, supra note 49, at 
1431 (noting the constitutional convention debates indicate the purpose of the Supremacy 
Clause was to ensure a federalism structure of government); White, supra note 38, at 979. 
223 Compare U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended.”), with id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution and the Laws of the United States 
. . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”). 
224 See id. amend. I. 
225 See id. amend. IV. 
1038 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1009 
prosecution.226 Instead, the Supremacy Clause ranks rights that exist 
elsewhere.227 
 Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has explicitly adhered 
to this interpretation of the Supremacy Clause as containing the limited 
power to rank conflicting rights.228 A suggestion that the Supremacy 
Clause creates a private cause of action in the same manner, for in-
stance, as the Fourteenth Amendment, misreads the purpose and his-
tory of the Supremacy Clause.229 
 In the nearly two decades since Shaw, nevertheless, inferior courts 
have determined that the Supreme Court has suggested otherwise— 
that the Supremacy Clause does, in fact, imply a cause of action in the 
preemption arena.230 Repeatedly, lower courts have stood in the foot-
prints of Shaw—and more recently Verizon—to declare that, in a pre-
emption case, no cause of action is needed because the Supremacy 
Clause implies one.231 
 Even in the wake of Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern 
California, Inc., the Supreme Court has done little to discourage this 
practice.232 Verizon, in particular, bolstered this reasoning with language 
that marched toward (without actually crossing) the line of empower-
ing the Supremacy Clause with cause of action status: 
                                                                                                                      
226 See id. amend. VI. 
227 See id. art. VI, cl. 2; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; Andrews, 525 F.2d at 118–19. 
228 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608–10; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 209, 210–11 (1824); Monaghan, supra note 85, at 242–43 (“That clause simply 
states a rule of priority: valid federal law prevails over conflicting state law. By itself the 
clause provides no algorithm for determining when concededly valid federal law can be 
asserted only as a defense, or when it can be employed also as a sword.”). The order func-
tion shone brightly as the essence of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden 
when he identified the Supremacy Clause as the reason a state law regarding river naviga-
tion must yield to a contrary federal law. See 22 U.S. at 210–11. One hundred, sixty-five 
years later in Golden State, the ordering function remains the sole function of the Suprem-
acy Clause; in that case, Justice Stevens wrote that, rather than creating rights, the Su-
premacy Clause established priority of federal rights in conflict with state rights. 493 U.S. 
at 107–08. 
229 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149–50 (1908) (holding that the plaintiffs had a 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process); Monaghan, supra note 85, at 240 n.55 (“But 
Ex parte Young does not dispense with the requirement that the plaintiff assert a federal 
remedial right, and the Court has long been understood to have assumed such a right 
from the fourteenth amendment.”); White, supra note 38, at 978–79. 
230 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75; Guaranty 
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he best explanation . . . is 
that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against 
state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.”). 
231 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75; Guaranty 
Nat’l, 916 F.2d at 512. 
232 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43. 
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The Commission contends that since the Act does not create 
a private cause of action to challenge the Commission’s order, 
there is no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. We need express 
no opinion on the premise of this argument. “It is firmly established 
in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to argu-
able) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter juris-
diction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to ad-
judicate the case.”233 
 Extracting from Shaw and Verizon that the Supremacy Clause does 
imply a cause of action in the preemption context, as have lower courts, 
is certainly reasonable.234 After all, in both Shaw and Verizon, the Court 
reached the merits of preemption suits without requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate a cause of action.235 For a Court that has reflected sensitiv-
ity about engaging a cause of action analysis over the past three-plus 
decades with development of the Sandoval and Gonzaga standards,236 
foregoing such an analysis in the preemption context resonates with 
powerful influence.237 
 The value of the Supremacy Clause to a federal court, however, 
should be irrelevant unless and until a case is properly before a court 
with respect to cause of action and jurisdiction.238 Analyzing the pre-
emptive nature of a federal law in contrast to a state law involves exam-
ining the merits of a case.239 Only if a plaintiff sues pursuant to a valid 
cause of action should a court reach the merits.240 Artificially increasing 
                                                                                                                      
233 See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 
83, 89 (1998)). Expressing no opinion on the argument, the Verizon Court did not decide 
whether or not the Supremacy Clause conferred a cause of action. See id. 
234 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
235 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
236 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89; Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 239 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
237 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. At least 
one commentator argues that the Court should explicitly hold that the Supremacy Clause 
confers a cause of action not only for Shaw plaintiffs, but also for all types of prospective 
preemption plaintiffs; doing so would advance the rule of law–-federal law controlling over 
contrary state law. Sloss, supra note 37, at 401–02 (arguing that Shaw preemption claims 
promote the rule of law by helping to ensure that state and local governments remain 
within the bounds of federal law). 
238 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168, 173 (1803); Monaghan, supra 
note 85, at 239–40. 
239 See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 241 (noting that, in California v. Sierra Club, 451 
U.S. 287, 293–94 (1981), when the Court did not find a cause of action in a prospective 
preemption suit, it specifically declared that it could not reach the merits–-the preemption 
issue–-of the claim). 
240 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–89, 293; Monaghan, supra note 85, at 240 n.55. 
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access to federal courts by reading a cause of action into the Supremacy 
Clause for all preemption plaintiffs does not support the rule of law 
because the relevance of the Supremacy Clause should become appar-
ent only when both jurisdiction and cause of action hurdles are 
cleared.241 Moreover, implying a cause of action in the Supremacy 
Clause against the Framers’ intentions dangerously injects flexibility 
into a provision that was conceived and written with rigid outlines.242 
C. Adherence to the Separation-of-Powers Principle 
 The Court has long been sensitive about its role in the expression 
of government, reflecting awareness of the separation-of-powers princi-
ple embodied in the Constitution.243 When federal courts inject the 
Supremacy Clause with cause of action power, they improperly infringe 
separation-of-power principles.244 If Congress had not made a political 
choice to create a cause of action for a particular plaintiff, then the ju-
diciary, as the nonpolitical branch of government, should not step into 
legislative shoes and imply one.245 
 As if the Court’s articulation of its own role were not enough to 
limit its ability to imply a cause of action, the Sandoval Court noted that 
Congress’s essential role in creating causes of action was acutely under-
stood, stating that “[p]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must 
be created by Congress. . . . Without it, a cause of action does not exist 
and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be 
as a policy matter . . . .”246 
                                                                                                                      
241 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–89, 293; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 149–50. 
242 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; White, supra note 38, at 978–79. 
243 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. 
[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. 
The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine 
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private 
remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a 
cause of action does not exist . . . . 
Id.; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297 (“The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a stat-
ute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 
167. Notably, the Marbury Court laid out guidelines for when it could overrule executive 
and legislative conduct, specifying that when Congress legislated outside the bounds of the 
Constitution and when the President violated individual rights, the Court could intercede. 
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165–66. 
244 See supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text. 
245 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286; see also Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297. 
246 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87. 
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 Therefore, when Congress, with its keen understanding of its role 
in establishing a cause of action, passes a law without a cause of action 
for a class of plaintiffs, it makes a political choice to withhold such a 
cause of action.247 When a preemption plaintiff relies on a federal law 
without a cause of action and the federal court uses Shaw and Verizon to 
imply a cause of action through the Supremacy Clause, the federal 
court crosses a separation-of-powers boundary that otherwise constrains 
the law-making power of the federal government.248 Such law making 
opens the so-called nonpolitical branch to charges of improper politi-
cal activity because it takes political power out of the hands of Congress 
and assumes it for the judiciary.249 
 The lower federal courts that have turned to Shaw and Verizon to 
imply causes of action through the Supremacy Clause have not ques-
tioned their authority to do so in a separation-of-powers context.250 In-
stead, they have asserted that the Court has implied a cause of action 
within the Supremacy Clause.251 
 To accept the argument that a plaintiff may bring a preemption 
claim solely under the Supremacy Clause is to overlook the incongruity 
between the federal judiciary’s constitutional role and the assertion of a 
cause of action power in the Supremacy Clause.252 The implication that 
the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action in preemption cases 
means that every federal law contains a cause of action for every poten-
tial plaintiff.253 This premise, in the sensitive cause of action environ-
ment of federal court, is simply implausible; it turns the principle of 
separation of powers on its head.254 What would be the point of Con-
gress choosing to withhold a cause of action if one could simply be im-
                                                                                                                      
247 See id. at 286–87; Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979) (noting that, 
when Congress enacts legislation, it understands its role in choosing to create or not create 
a cause of action); Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
248 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698–99; Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
249 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87. 
250 See Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75; Guaranty 
Nat’l, 916 F.2d at 512. 
251 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1058–59 (2008) (“A party 
may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted even 
if the federal law at issue does not create a private right of action.”), vacated sub nom. Doug-
las v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). 
252 See Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1234 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the absence 
of congressional intent the Judiciary’s recognition of an implied private right of action 
‘necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to re-
solve.’” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 128 
(2008))). 
253 See id. 
254 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87; Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
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plied through the Supremacy Clause?255 To suggest that the Supremacy 
Clause implies a cause of action in the preemption context is to com-
pletely write cause of action precedent out of the books.256 
D. In the Interest of Federalism 
 Implying causes of action through the Supremacy Clause in pre-
emption cases undermines federalism concerns evident in the pre-
sumption against preemption doctrine.257 
 In its articulation of the presumption, the Supreme Court bal-
anced the requirement that federal law supersedes state law with the 
concern that state sovereignty is an essential ingredient in a federalist 
government.258 To the extent then that the presumption against pre-
emption indicates the value of state sovereignty, the implication that 
the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action in the preemption con-
text undermines that value.259 
 Whereas on one hand the presumption against preemption oper-
ates as a bulwark, protecting state sovereignty, on the other hand, an 
implied cause of action built into the Supremacy Clause tears down 
that protection.260 A state defendant who cannot argue that a preemp-
tion plaintiff does not have a valid cause of action loses some protection 
of its sovereignty vis-a-vis the federal government.261 In this regard, the 
Supreme Court undermined its own presumption against preemption 
principle when it denied Maryland the ability to argue that the Verizon 
plaintiffs did not have a proper cause of action to enforce the Tele-
communications Act of 1996.262 Lower courts have followed in line, 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87; Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
256 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108 (holding that the Su-
premacy Clause, in fact, does not confer a cause of action for prospective preemption cases 
involving § 1983 plaintiffs); Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
257 See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (noting that, if possi-
ble, the Court has “a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption”); Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
258 See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (assuming that “the historic police 
powers of the state are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress”). 
259 See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449. 
260 Compare Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 (presuming against preemption in its preemption 
analysis and therefore decreasing the likelihood of preemption), with Verizon, 535 U.S. at 
642–43 (allowing a prospective preemption suit without conducting a cause of action 
analysis and therefore increasing the likelihood of preemption). 
261 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43. 
262 See id. 
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rejecting state and local governments’ arguments that preemption 
plaintiffs assert no valid cause of action to enforce federal law.263 
 Lower courts have been more explicit than the Supreme Court, 
however, relying on the fact that the Verizon Court reached the merits of 
the suit without conducting a thorough cause of action analysis to de-
termine whether the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of action in 
preemption cases.264 In light of federalism concerns reflected in the 
presumption against preemption doctrine, the notion that the Su-
premacy Clause implies a cause of action in preemption cases becomes 
all the more dubious; this interpretation necessarily deprives state and 
local governments of an affirmative defense, the very defense that led 
the Sandoval state defendant to victory.265 If causes of action are read 
into the Supremacy Clause, state defendants will lose the ability to ar-
gue that the allegedly preemptive federal statute provides no cause of 
action; this argument would be moot in face of courts asserting that the 
Supremacy Clause provides an unspoken cause of action.266 
 State defendants should take note that the Supreme Court pro-
vided an opening in Independent Living to defend against preemption 
suits by arguing that plaintiffs lack a cause of action.267 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, An-
tonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito, stated vigorously that the Supremacy 
Clause does not provide an independent cause of action.268 The major-
ity opinion did not arrive at a conclusion to such a question.269 Instead, 
it delayed resolution for another day, meaning that any one of the five 
justices in the majority could join the dissent when, at long last, the 
Court has to decide whether the Supremacy Clause contains an implied 
cause of action.270 
                                                                                                                      
263 See Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1059; Planned Parenthood, 403 F.3d at 331–32; Local Union, 377 
F.3d at 74–75; Guaranty Nat’l, 916 F.2d at 512. 
264 See Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1058–59; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
265 See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642–43; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288; 
Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75. 
266 See Local Union, 377 F.3d at 74–75 (rejecting the state agency’s argument that the 
prospective preemption plaintiff lacked a valid cause of action because one could be im-
plied under Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence). 
267 Indep. Living, 132 S. Ct. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
268 Id. at 1212 (“To decide this case, it is enough to conclude that the Supremacy 
Clause does not provide a cause of action to enforce the requirements of [the federal law] 
when Congress, in establishing those requirements, elected not to provide such a cause of 
action in the statute itself.”). 
269 Id. at 1211 (majority opinion). 
270 See id. 
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Conclusion 
 A cause of action is the source of an individual’s right to sue in 
federal court. The Supreme Court has a long history of holding that a 
cause of action must always be present for that right to be recognized as 
valid. In a preemption suit, it is improper to both forego a cause of ac-
tion analysis at the outset and to suggest that a cause of action other-
wise absent may be implied by way of the Supremacy Clause. That 
Clause, the function of which has traditionally been limited to ranking 
rights already in existence, contains no power to confer new rights in 
the form of a cause of action. 
 Nevertheless, state and local defendants have been increasingly 
powerless to defend on cause of action grounds against certain pre-
emption plaintiffs who explicitly allege that federal law preempts state 
law or action. This reality has created perverse results and perverse in-
centives. In contrast to Shaw plaintiffs who explicitly allege preemption, 
plaintiffs who imply preemption through allegations of federal law vio-
lations and plaintiffs who assert preemption in connection with a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim are required to demonstrate a valid cause of action. 
The unbalanced treatment of plaintiffs motivates all preemption plain-
tiffs to characterize themselves as Shaw plaintiffs, thereby cutting off a 
defense for state defendants. 
 The elimination of a cause of action defense creates problems be-
yond unequal treatment of preemption plaintiffs. It injects the Su-
premacy Clause with cause of action powers unforeseen by the Framers, 
enables the federal judiciary to improperly wade into legislative waters, 
and undermines a delicate principle of federalist governance—the pre-
sumption that federal law does not preempt state law. 
 Going forward, state defendants must be able to effectively assert 
that the plaintiff must sue pursuant to a valid cause of action. Federal 
courts must recognize that the Framers never intended for the Su-
premacy Clause to serve as a cause of action; allowing it to do so for 
select plaintiffs disserves the idea of equal justice. 
 By maintaining a keen awareness of the cause of action require-
ment, federal court litigants and the judges can restore fairness and 
legal consistency to preemption doctrine. 
Dustin M. Dow 
